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Expected longevity is an important factor inuencing older individuals' decisions such as con-
sumption, savings, purchase of life insurance and annuities, claiming of Social Security bene-
ts, and labor supply. It has also been shown to be a good predictor of actual longevity, which
in turn is highly correlated with health status. A relatively new literature on health invest-
ments under uncertainty, which builds upon the seminal work by Grossman (1972), has directly
linked longevity with characteristics, behaviors, and decisions by utility maximizing agents.
Our empirical model can be understood within that theoretical framework as estimating a pro-
duction function of longevity. Using longitudinal data from the Health and Retirement Study,
we directly incorporate health dynamics in explaining the variation in expected longevities, and
compare two alternative measures of health dynamics: the self-reported health change, and the
computed health change based on self-reports of health status. In 38% of the reports in our
sample, computed health changes are inconsistent with the direct report on health changes over
time. And another 15% of the sample can suffer from information losses if computed changes
are used to assess changes in actual health. These potentially serious problems raise doubts re-
garding the use and interpretation of the computed health changes and even the lagged measures
of self-reported health as controls for health dynamics in a variety of empirical settings. Our
empirical results, controlling for both subjective and objective measures of health status and
unobserved heterogeneity in reporting, suggest that self-reported health changes are a preferred
measure of health dynamics.
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Expected longevity is an important factor inuencing older individuals' decisions such as con-
sumption, savings, purchase of life insurance and annuities, claiming of Social Security benets,
and labor supply. It has also been shown to be a good predictor of actual longevity (see Hurd
et al. (1999), Smith et al. (2001), Hurd and McGarry (2002), and Siegel et al. (2003)), which in
turn is highly correlated with health.1 Since the seminal work of Grossman (1972), longevity has
usually been introduced in human capital models of health as endogenously determined through
the characterization of death as the event that occurs when the stock of health falls below a certain
threshold. Grossman's original presentation of longevity as an endogenous choice, within his cele-
brated health production model, was problematic, as he acknowledges (and amends) in Grossman
(1998) and Grossman (2000). The role of longevity as an endogenously determined process in
models under certainty has been more properly characterized and discussed in Ehrlich and Chuma
(1990) and Ried (1998). In particular, Ehrlich and Chuma (1990) show that in order to correctly
solve the original model it is necessary to characterize a demand function for longevity (along with
the demand for health and the demand for consumption goods), which claries the mechanisms that
link health investment with the optimal choice of life span.
A particularly important, but much less discussed set of extensions to that original research on
health investments, has introduced uncertainty in multiperiod models that allow for the dual role
of health as an input to the production of future health, and as a source of current utility. Cropper
(1977)introduceduncertaintyasa shockthatreduces the healththresholdunder whichanindividual
is considered to be ill, and she dened death as a state of indenite illness. Liljas (1998), and the
clarications and extensions in Tabata and Ohkusa (2000), and Liljas (2000), provide a theoretical
framework in which health evolves in a stochastic fashion, which in turn endogenously determines
the longevity of individuals given that death is again assumed to occur when the health stock drops
below a pre-specied minimum level. Since longevity is a function of health, it is therefore also
stochastic. Those authors, however, do not directly focus on the issue of longevity, and therefore
1These longevity expectations might be a more appropriatevariable to use in a variety of models comparedto using
aggregate indicators of life expectancy (see Gan et al. (2005) and Gan et al. (2004)). Furthermore, individuals make
decisions based on their expected longevity instead of the actual one, which they are unlikely to know ahead of time.
1do not present a discussion of whether their model provides new insights into the endogenously
determined longevity process.2
Ehrlich (2000) and Ehrlich and Yin (2005) directly tackle the role of longevity within a model
of health investments under uncertainty, extending the work of Ehrlich and Chuma (1990). In their
model, mortality probabilities depend not only on natural and biological factors as well as other
initial conditions, but also on health investments as self-protection (using the insights from Ehrlich
andBecker (1972)). Self-protectionisdescribedasafunctionoftimeallocatedtotheseinvestments,
health expenditures, and efciency indicators like education.3
The estimation of the determinants of longevity expectations we present in this paper could
therefore be understood within the general framework of health investments under uncertainty,
where our main estimated equation is in fact a reduced form characterization of the survival proba-
bilityequationpresented in Ehrlich (2000). It is therefore akinto a productionfunctionof longevity.
The Health and Retirement Study (HRS) asks individuals to assess the chances of surviving to a
certain age. Since this is of course conditional on being alive, we will consider this probability to
be what Ehrlich (2000) presents as the expected probability of survival.
Given that expected longevity is therefore naturally a function of health, it is key to decide how
health is to be measured. Empirical researchers have used a variety of self-reported indicators, both
subjective and objective, as proxies for health status, such as self-rated health, incidence of chronic
diseases, Activities of Daily Living (ADLs), Instrumental Activities of Daily Living (IADLs), and
measures of health limitation. Self-rated health has been found to play a signicant role in ex-
plaining individuals' mortality by many researchers. Mossey and Shapiro (1982) are credited with
one of the rst convincing pieces on this issue. Since then, it has been a robust nding in studies
among working-age adults (Miilunpalo et al. (1997)), older adults (Lee (2000) and Mete (2005)),
2Picone et al. (1998) introduce health uncertainty in a model of health investments and savings, but do not analyze
the effects of health on longevity.
3In their model, self-protective investments affect the conditional probability density of the occurrence of death at
a given point in time, given survival to that date. This density is then integrated between any two periods in order
to compute the probability of survival between those periods. Notice, that for tractability, the authors assume that
mortality follows a continuous Poisson process that can be expressed as an Exponential distribution. In their analysis,
the authors focus on the ow effect of self-protection, but do not allow it to have an effect on the stock of health. In our
empirical analysis this assumption is relaxed, further justifying the use of measures of health changes, since they can
be considered as summary statistics of past self-protection that modify past and current stocks of health.
2and among all groups of the population by socioeconomic status (Burstr¨ om and Fredlund (2001)).
Interpreting the evidence up to that point, Idler and Benyamini (1997) present a review on 27 stud-
ies, and conclude that self-rated health is an independent predictor of mortality, even controlling for
objective measures of health. They propose a variety of interpretations to this result, one of which
states that self-rated health is a dynamic evaluation, judging trajectory and not only current level
of health. Ferraro and Kelley-Moore (2001) using panel data also nd support for the link between
self-reported health and mortality. Moreover, they argue that self-rated health can be considered a
dynamic measure of health.
But does self-rated healthwhile controlling for other objective health measurescapture all
the important information regarding health that could help understand longevity expectations? We
argue that a measure of health dynamics should be of value in understanding how individuals are
assessing future states of the world.4 This is especially true given that the dynamic component of
health can come from a variety of sources which are likely linked with any assessment of how long
a person is likely to live. First, individuals invest in their health through, for example, visits to
health professionals for preventive care, changes in their diets, exercise, and changes in habits such
as smoking or drinking. As we have discussed, it is natural to believe that the outcomes of these
investments on a person's health status are uncertain, and in many cases these health investment
decisions are the result of previous diagnoses of particular conditions. Second, health depreciates in
a fairly continuous fashion through the natural aging process and through the worsening of chronic
conditions. Third, health can deteriorate (or improve) signicantly in rather discontinuous (and
non-monotonic) ways as health shocks occur. The effects on a person's health of the last two types
of events are also uncertain and can depend on their interaction with the rst type of investments,
as well as on attitudes towards treatment and recovery, and towards life in general.
No single measure is likely to capture all these components. Therefore, the absence of a gold
4A number of recent papers present evidence of the effects of health changes on retirement expectations. Ben´ tez-
Silva and Dwyer (2005) show that (computed) health changes affect older American workers' retirement expectations
innovations. McGarry (2004) has shown that self-reported health declines have a negative effect on older workers'
retirement expectations, and hinted at the point that using computed differences of health status might lead to informa-
tion loss. Au et al. (2005) using Canadian data nd that computed health changes and lagged health affect the working
decisions of older individuals, but they nd that the effect of health changes is considerably smaller than that of health
levels. In an earlier study, Deeg et al. (1989) found that the effects of self-rated health diminishes once we control for
self-reported health declines in a study of mortality.
3standard to assess the validity (longitudinal criterion validity, in the sense of ability to capture
meaningful health changes) of measures of health changes, justies a discussion of the advantages
and disadvantages of different measures, and their assessment in the empirical arena. We argue
in some length below that using differences in self-reported health status can be problematic since
they can fail to capture meaningful health changes among respondents. We also emphasize that its
use in panel studies can exacerbate the biases intrinsic to measuring any continuous latent variable,
due to cut-point shifts (the cut-points between health categories might not be xed over time for
a given individual, or they might even be areas dividing health categories) and reference groups
effects (individuals might report their health as compared with people their age). Notice that the
same criticisms would apply to the use of lagged health measures. Therefore, we advocate for the
use of a direct health change measure which is lessexposed to biases, and avoids lossof information
connected with the discretization of a continuous latent variable.
In this paper, we nd that self-reported health changes are a cleaner measure of health dynam-
ics than computed measures using differences in health status, or lagged measures of health status.
Furthermore, we nd that the effect of our preferred measure of health changes on longevity ex-
pectations has the same order of magnitude as that of the self-reported health level. This stresses
the importance of accounting for health dynamics. These results suggest that self-reported health
changes should be used, when available, in empirical and behavioral models as an important com-
plement to standard measures of health, in order to capture the dynamics of health, and to consis-
tently estimate the effects of self-reported health status. The insights from this study are likely to
inuence the empirical characterizations in a large number of studies regarding, for example, health
care expenditures, consumption over the life cycle, and retirement behavior, in which the variables
of interest are likely to be affected by the dynamic evolution of health.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes and critically analyzes mea-
sures of health status and health changes from both a conceptual as well as an empirical perspective.
Section 3 presents the data used in our econometric estimations. In Section 4, we discuss the em-
pirical methods used in this study. Section 5 presents the results of our panel analysis of longevity
expectations formation, and Section 6 concludes.
42 Measuring Health and Health Dynamics
Self-reported measures of health are pervasivelyused in empirical work to capture the role of health
on individual behavior, and expectations formation. However, in recent years a large number of
researchers have questioned the validity of these measures. In general, the concept of validity
of a health measure is taken to mean whether the measure accurately reects health status, and
therefore can be considered as a useful indicator in empirical and behavioral economic models.
The discussion in the economic literature regarding validity of self-reported health measures is
mainly focused on its cross-sectional validity, even if authors were using panel and time-series data
of the variablesof interest. Researchers havebeen concerned withthe use of these variables because
of the possible econometric problems that using these measures could introduce. In Appendix A
we present a short discussion of issues of cross-sectional validity, and their assessment using our
sample from the Health and Retirement Study.
The economic literature has paid relatively little attention to the issue of how to measure health
changes, or to analyze whether this type of variables belong in our models. Even if it is widely
recognized that health is a dynamic concept, in most cases researchers have focused on measuring
the stock of health. As we discussed in the introduction, some researchers have argued that self-
reported health status by itself has a dynamic component. But this has not been shown in any
convincing fashion. In the cases where researchers have tried to measure health dynamics, they
have either limited themselves to including lagged values of the self-reports in their specications,
or did not discuss the consequences of using different measures to capture health dynamics.5
In other disciplines, however, measuring health changes is at least as important as measuring
the level of health. This is mainly because in those elds they are concerned with measuring the
consequences of some type of intervention that can affect a person's health. For example, a lit-
erature in the medical and medical care elds, which has especially focused on studies of quality
of life indicators, argues that the ability to detect changes (which is a characteristic dened as re-
5Bound et al. (1999) emphasize the dynamic nature of health, and nd that lagged health indicators can play a role
in retirement behavior. More recently Au et al. (2005) reached similar conclusions using computed health changes and
lagged measures of health. They do not directly compare different possible measures of health dynamics, especially
they do not use self-reported health changes.
5sponsiveness or sensitivity to change) is an intrinsic part of the general validity of any self-reported
measure of health. Therefore, researchers should not evaluate the validity of a measure without
paying attention to its ability to detect changes. The discussions in Guyatt et al. (1989), Hays and
Hadorn (1992), Liang (2000), Erickson (2000), Patrick and Chiang (2000), Epstein (2000), and
more recently in Terwee et al. (2003) are quite illuminating. They extend the classic assessments
of the general criteria that a good measure of health outcome must have, which has been discussed
in McDowell and Newell (1987), Streiner and Norman (1989), and Bowling (1991). Terwee et al.
(2003) emphasize a very important distinction regarding the link between validity and responsive-
ness. They argue that many researchers have failed to distinguish between cross-sectional validity
and longitudinal validity of the measures they use, with only the latter concept being linked to re-
sponsiveness. Notice that self-reported health status indicators, in the poor to excellent scale,
seem to clearly be cross-sectionally valid but their longitudinal validity is still an open issue.
As we mentioned in the introduction, the absence of a widely accepted measure of health dy-
namics motivates a discussion of the weaknesses and strengths of some of the measures available to
the empirical researchers. We present this discussion below, and section 3 and Appendix B provide
the empirical background for the discussion. The ultimate assessment of the measures is presented
in the empirical results section, where we estimate a production function of longevity through the
analysis of longevity expectations.
2.1 Dynamic Health Status: heterogeneous reporting and information loss
To understand how changes in self-reported health can be linked to changes in other measures of
healthisan essentialpartof ananalysisonthevalidityof self-reportedhealth. Furthermore, we need
to understand whether reported changes in health are measures of health trajectories, and whether
these trajectories can inuence how individuals report their longevity expectations and other useful
and important variables. Notice as well that using the diagnose of diseases seems like a reasonable
strategy too, however, the onset of the disease is not observed. Therefore, if we do not observe a
particular diagnose, it does not necessarily mean an individual is free from that ailment. Moreover,
in a given period, individuals who have experienced the diagnosis of a disease could be in an even
6better health status than those who have not been diagnosed, because the latter could actually have
already experienced the onset of the disease but do not know it and therefore are not treating it.
In the HRS (and in many other surveys), self-rated health was asked as follows: Would you say
your health is excellent, very good, good, fair, or poor? Although true health status is in principle
a continuous (latent) variable, it is discretized in a particular way (in this case into ve categories)
when asked to individuals. Hence, two general arguments can be given against the idea that health
status (and its lags) alone should be used in empirical models that try to control for the dynamics
of health. First, self-reports of health status may be affected by unobserved heterogeneity. Second,
using its changes over time to proxy for health dynamics could lead to information loss. We analyze
each of these possibilities in turn.
Heterogeneity in reporting health status across individuals and over-time: cut-point shifts, gray
areas, and peer-effects
Forcing individuals to discretize their reported health status can result in different self-reported
health levels for individuals with the same latent health status, due to the lack of clear cut differ-
ences between the ad-hoc health categories proposed to the respondents. The effect of this lack of
distinction between categories can also result in a situation where even if an individual's real health
does not change over time, her(his) self-rated health might change.6 Figure 1, panels (a) to (d),
illustrates these situations.
Panel (a) in the upper left-hand corner, represents individuals who are able to make clear dis-
tinctions between those ve health categories (bins) when reporting their health status. There is no
reason to believe that the cut-points would be the same for everyone and overtime, but for the mo-
ment, and for this type of individual, we assume that they would be the same for a given individual
over time. Most empirical studies implicitly assume that individuals are of this type.7
6Crossley and Kennedy (2002) using repeated self-reported health questions (in the same scale as the one we use
in this study) only separated by a short period of time during an interview process, found that almost 30% of the
individuals actually changed their self-reports. This instability of the self-reported measure is a source of concern,
especially for any study trying to use lag self-reports or changes of these self-reports in any empirical model. Their
explanationsof the ndings are linked with the way the questions were administered, and the type of questions asked in
between the two instants. It is hard to assess whether we would expect more or less stability if instead of a few minutes
we wait literally a couple of years to ask the question again, but in any case this is another reason to be cautious when
using self-reported health as a measure of health dynamics.
7Sharmaet al. (2004)arguethat if healthis multi-dimensional,and adjustmentcosts to healthchangesareaccounted
for, a consensus within a population on rankings of health states is impossible.
7Panel (b), exempliesthe case in whicheven thoughindividualscan clearly distinguishdifferent
health categories, the cut-points might be shifting over time for a given individual. This might be
caused by changing perceptions of what particular health levels mean, due to changes in a reference
group, or even changes in their own understanding of their health. These shifts, can again be
different for different individuals or for the same individual over time, which would suggest the
possible existence of time-variant unobserved heterogeneity in reporting.
In summary, individuals in panel (a) and panel (b) would have little difculty to differentiate
their health between two consecutive categories, while in panel (b) the reports might change even if
actual health does not change. In contrast, individuals in panel (c) and (d) would nd it rather dif-
cult to decide what their health is if their health falls within one of the shaded regions. Moreover,
the difculties increase with the thickness of those areas.
Panel (c), represents individuals who do not have clear cut distinctions between each two con-
secutive health categories. Instead, these respondents have what we call gray areas, like the one












￿ . The idea is that if their health status falls within
these areas, individuals cannot clearly categorize it, and their actual reports could be a function of






















￿ . It is hard for her to decide whether she
has good health or very good health. She could report either one with a positive probability, such
that the following situation may happen. In period






￿ , she reports her health as good. In this case, as econometricians, we observe that her




all along. One of the possible reasons
why she reported this way could be that in the rst period she felt more optimistic than in the next
period, so the measure is contextual. There is no reason to believe that these gray areas would be
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Figure 1: Heterogeneous Health Reports
9Finally, panel (d) depicts the case in which the gray areas might be changing over time for a
givenindividual,partly due to the same reasons as in the shifts in panel (b): changes in the reference
groups or informational changes with respect to their own health. This case can be understood as
combining both time-invariant and time-variant unobserved heterogeneity in reporting. As long as
the shifts are partially correlated with observables, and not too large, an estimator that captures
time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity might be subject to relatively small biases.
A number of researchers have suggested the existence of cut-points shifts in assessing self-
reported health. However, these authors have only discussed it in the context of differences across
individuals in a given population, or differences in individuals' responses across countries, but not
in the context of responses by the same individual over time, and they have not discussed the gray
areas that we describe above. The possible existence of these gray areas is key, since it allows us to
reformulate the econometric problem as arising from unobserved heterogeneity. The terminology
researchers have used varies, but Kerkhofs and Lindeboom (1995), Groot (2000), Sadana et al.
(2000), Murray et al. (2001), van Doorslaer and Jones (2003), and Lindeboom and van Doorslaer
(2004) provide evidence of cut-points shifts, and consider it a problem of measurement error.
As explained above, if we assume the gray areas are stable over-time, an estimation strategy
that can account for time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity, can be successful in consistently esti-
mating the effects of health changes. So we could think of the measurement error problem resulting
from unobserved heterogeneity in reporting due to the existence of these areas. We acknowledge
that there could still be cut-point shifts of different magnitudes, or gray area changes over time for
a given person. The latter would be difcult to account for within any estimation strategy.
Besides heterogeneity, peer effects can be another explanation for these apparently inconsistent
reports, and for the thickness of these gray areas. Self-reported health status is likely to be the
result of an introspection that requires individuals to compare themselves either with a reference
group or with themselves at previous points in time.8 In the former case it is plausible that when
8The theory of reference groups has a long tradition in Sociology starting with Hyman (1942) and Kelley (1947),
and more recently with some empirical applications, for example in Bank et al. (1990). In Economics, the concept has
been studied in a numberof contexts(forexample, Pollak (1976)presents it as workingthroughpreferences),but rarely
in the contextof effects onreportingbehavior. Manski (1993)providesan illuminatingdiscussion of the difcultiesthat
researchers can encounter to identify these types of effects in any empirical setting, and Alessie and Kapteyn (1991)
and Kapteyn et al. (1997) present some empirical applications. For a more general discussion of the role of personal
10reporting health status individuals are making a comparison with people of a similar age who they
interact with or know about. This means that someone might report that they are in good health,
while what they really mean is that they are in good health in comparison with their particular
reference group. In the following period, depending on the evolution of their health with respect to
the reference group, theymightreport their health as being in a better or worse category than before,
even if there has been no change in their actual health, or even if their true health has evolved in the
opposite direction. If these peer effects are present, it will be especially problematic to use changes
in self-reported health status as measures of change.9
In contrast, self-reported health changes were asked to individuals by giving them a clear ref-
erence point.10 Respondents were asked: Compared with your health when we talked with you in
the previous wave (interview month-year), would you say that your health is better now, about the
same, or worse? In this case, measurement errors and possiblebiases due to inconsistentreplies of
self-reported health status over time, are likely to be lower. The wording of the question forces in-
dividuals to provide a comparison with their own health at a different point in time, which mitigates
the peer effects described above. It also avoids the issue of cut-point shifts, since the assessment of
the health change is not category-specic. Intuitively, however, we acknowledge that this variable
might be exposed to measurement error problems of its own, given the likelihood of respondents
having recall problems. These recall problems are essentially equivalent to a situation in which
people use different points in time as reference when faced with this question. This is not a big
problem as long as the measure actually captures the direction of health changes and its effects on
contemporaneous reports of other variables and decisions.11
ties in health outcomes see NRC (2001)
9Notice that these peer effects can not only affect the self-reports themselves, but also affect the cut-points which
could be shifting as a result of peer effects. Moreover, they could affect the width of the gray areas we have described,
and even the possible changes of these areas over time.
10Not all household surveys ask self-reported health questions in the same way. For example, in the National Health
Interview Survey (NHIS) prior to 1997, as discussed in Cutler and Richardson (1997) and Cutler and Richardson
(1998), and the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS), as described in Groot (2000) and Contoyannis et al. (2004),
the self-reported health question was directly asked proposing individuals to compare their health with that of their
peers. This indicates that any use of differences in this measure to proxy for health changes would for sure capture
changes in their health as relative to their peers. In fact, Eriksson et al. (2001) compare self-reported health measures
like the one in the HRS with another one similar to the one used in the BHPS, and concludethat measures which do not
suggest a comparison group are more appropriate for longitudinal studies. They nd that comparative measures lead
individuals to overestimate their health in relation to others with increasing age.
11Ross (1989) and Norman (2003) discuss the problems linked to using health measures that require recalling previ-
11Given the likely existence of unobserved heterogeneity in reporting, it will be critical in our
estimations to account for this unobserved heterogeneity, and possibly also for the likely event that
the unobserved components are correlated with the very reports of health and health changes.
Information loss
Even if individuals do not change the standards they use to evaluate their health, we may still
lose information if we restrict attention to differences of health status to measure health dynamics.


































his self-rated health is good in both periods, unless we use a different measure of health changes
from the computed one, we would have thrown away information regarding his health change. It
is difcult to assess how large this information loss could be, given that the range of each of the
self-reported health bins can vary widely in the population. But it is easy to see that it is something
empirical researchers should worry about. In fact, researchers in the medical eld have described
this type of information loss when analyzing how to assess change in health among severely ill
patients. Bindman et al. (1990) present a case study in which the use of self-rated measures over
time to assess changes in health misses important information when dealing with people in very
poor health. This is the case because once some individuals are in this lowest possible category
they will keep reporting it even though they might actually be in worse health over time. These
researchers call this effect the oor phenomenon, which is also described in Gold et al. (1996), and
Testa and Simonson (1996). Baker et al. (1997), elaborating on this phenomenon, show that this
loss of information can vary in size depending on the level of baseline health, with larger losses of
information among people reporting worse health status. The self-reported measures in the HRS
will naturally suffer from similar problems. Furthermore, since it can also happen in every possible
health category, we can be facing a very important source of information loss, which might depend
on how wide these categories are for given individuals, and the persistence of these health states
ous health states. Their concerns are especially relevant in clinical settings where the researcher is trying to assess the
effectiveness of treatment which the patients know about, and in cases where surveys directly ask individuals to report
past health states. However, the concerns they raise have convinced us to interpret our measure of self-reported health
changes only as capturingthe direction(and intensity) of health changes, once we control for the unobservedindividual
heterogeneity in terms of the particular period to which they are referring.
12among HRS respondents.
Given the likely presence of heterogeneous reporting, and possible loss of information, it is nat-
ural to argue in favor of a direct measure of health dynamics, like the self-reported health changes,
which can ameliorate some of these problems.
3 The Data: Descriptive Analysis
The Health and Retirement Study is a nationally representative longitudinal survey of 7,700 house-
holds as of the rst wave of interviews, headed by an individual aged 51 to 61 as of 1992-93. It
is a survey conducted by the Survey Research Center (SRC) at the University of Michigan and
funded by the National Institute on Aging.12 In the empirical work we use the rst six waves
of the HRS, and construct a set of consistent variables on different sources of income, nancial
and non-nancial wealth, health, and socio-demographic characteristics which will be assigned to
each decision maker appropriately. The HRS collects information on both subjective and objective
health measures on health status, such as self-rated health, chronic diseases, Activities of Daily
Living (ADLs), and Instrumental Activities of Daily Living (IADLs).
3.1 Variables of Interest
The two main dependent variables in our empirical models are questions about individuals' subjec-
tive survival probability of living up to a certain age. First, (What is the percent chance) that you
will live to be 75 or more? was asked to those who are not older than 65. Second, (What is the
percent chance) that you will live to be 85 or more? was asked to whoever is not older than age
75.13 Responses to these two questions are taken as measures of individuals' expected longevity.14
12See Juster and Suzman (1995) and Gustman et al. (1995). The survey over sampled Blacks, Hispanics, and resi-
dentsofFlorida. Inthe results sectionwediscuss somesensitivity analysiswe haveperformedusingthe sampleweights
in the HRS.
13These probability questions were asked in percentages in all waves except in wave 1, where respondents were
asked to answer with a number between zero and ten. We have transformed those percentages or numbers to a value
between zero and one, which can be interpreted as probabilities.
14The fact that a fairly large number of respondents replied to these questions giving potential focal points answers;
either a zero probability (around 6% of the sample for the living to 75 question, but over 15% for the living to 85 ques-
tion) a 50% probability (around 20% for both the living to 75 and living to 85 questions), or a 100% probability (also
around 20% for the living to 75 question, but only around 10% for the living to 85 expectation), has been interpreted
13Regarding health variables, self-rated health is a categorical variable, which in our empirical
work we divide into ve binary indicators, representing poor health, fair health, good health, very
good health, and excellent health. We also use chronic disease indicators with information on seven
conditions; namely, high blood pressure, diabetes, cancer, lung disease, heart disease, stroke, and
arthritis. We have further generated four ADL-IADL indexes following the suggestions in Wallace
and Herzog (1995) and only including questions asked consistently across waves: mobility, use of
large muscles, other ADLs, and IADLs. Each of these indexes takes the value 1 if the individual
has difculties in doing all that type of activities, and 0 if he has no difculty performing any of
them. For example, the ADL-Mobility includes six different activities, such as running a mile,
walking one block, walking multiple blocks, walk across the room, climb multiple ights of stairs,





& to the index.15
Functional limitation is measured as a binary indicator for whether the individual has any health
problemswhichlimithisabilitytowork. We alsoconstructanindicatorfor psychologicalproblems,
an indicator of self-reported memory ability, and an indicator of self-reported changes in memory
ability.
The two main health change variables we have generated are, rst, the direct health change
measure, which is individuals' self-reports of their health changes compared to last interview. It
is 2 if the individual reported his health is much better, 1 if the individual reported his health is a
little better, 0 if his health stays the same, and -2 and -1 if his health has worsened considerably
or just a little, respectively. Second, the computed health ow measure is an indicator of whether
individuals' health gets much better (a value of 2), a little better (1) same (0), much worse (-2),
(see Hill et al. (2005)) as possibly indicating lack of information. This is rather controversial, given the discussion in
Ehrlich and Chuma (1990). In that paper individuals choose their health investment and their longevity, therefore it is
possible to rationalize low or even zero (or 100%) probabilities of living to a certain age. In any case it mainly creates
the problemof non-normalregressionerrors,since the distributionof the dependentvariablecouldbe consideredmulti-
modal. In general the results of conditional moments estimation, for example OLS or panel data regression models,
are fairly robust to this problem, especially if the sample size is large. The most important properties of the linear
estimators (that they are the best linear unbiased estimators and consistent, and that the variance estimator is unbiased
and consistent allowing us to use conventional tests), survive the non-normality of the errors. However, there can be a
loss of efciency.
15ADL-Muscles includes six activities: sitting for two hours, getting up, stooping, pushing or pulling large objects,
extending arms above shoulder, and lift a heavy bag of groceries. ADL-Other includes four activities: bathing, eating,
dressing, and getting in or out of bed. The IADL index includes ve activities: picking up a dime, taking medicine,
managing money, making phone calls, and using a map.
14or little worse (-1), based on the computed difference between the reports on his contemporaneous
health and lagged health. In the empirical work we construct binary indicators for belonging to
each of these categories.16
In order to include them in our model of changes in the probabilities of living to certain ages,
additional measures of health changes between each two consecutive waves have also been incor-
porated in the study. We include indicators for newly diagnosed chronic conditions, and variables
measuring the changes in the ADL-IADL indexes. Binary indicators of new occurrence of working
limitationin between waves, as well as changes in health insurance coverage have been constructed.
Livinghabits such as smokingand drinking, and their changes between two consecutivewaves have
been measured as binary indicators.17
We have also included in our analysis information on individuals' demographic characteristics,
such as measures of age, gender, marital status, race and education. Education is measured by the
number of years the individual received formal education. Marital status takes the value one if
the individual is married, and 0 otherwise. Additionally, parents', siblings' and kids' information
has been collected in the HRS, which allows us to generate a series of variables that are likely to
capture a number of possibly unobserved features correlated with expected longevity. Binary indi-
cators for whether the individuals' mothers (fathers) lived up to age 75 and age 85 are constructed.
Parents' education have been measured by the years of formal education they received. These six
measures are mainly used to capture genetic effects on expected longevities, as suggested by the
theoretical framework in Ehrlich (2000). We also use a measure on number of living siblings from
the supplement data provided by RAND which is constructed based on the HRS. Moreover, we
construct an indicator for whether respondents have children living within 10 miles. The number
of grandchildren is used in our analysis as well.
Finally, variables on economic status and labor supply are constructed. Household net wealth
16The much better (worse) indicator of computed health changes reects jumps of two or more health categories
between waves.
17Notice that the latter are rather different from the rest of the variables, since in most cases the changes in these
habits are the result of decisions by the individuals, and in most cases in the direction of quitting, which at these ages is
likely to be linked to other health problems. This suggest that these variables might be collinear with other indicators
of health changes, resulting in a loss of efciency of the estimates. We thank Govind Hariharan for pointing this out to
us.
15has been adjusted to dollars of 1992, includes savings and checking accounts, bonds, stocks, real
estates, business owned, IRAs, trust, housing, and other assets net of debts. Individual income is
taken from the RAND data.
3.2 Health Dynamics
In the Health and Retirement Study, we are able to measure health changes in three different ways:
self-reported health changes, computed health changes of self-rated health status, and new diagnose
of diseases. There are reasons, as discussedin Section 2, to believethat self-reported health changes
could be the best measure among the three.
Table 1: Computed health changes and self-reported health changes
SR-Health Changes
Computed Health Changes MB LB Same LW MW Total
Much Better 312 253 1,754 204 32 2,555
Little Better 817 1,031 8,744 1,439 200 12,231
Same 1,247 2,064 24,222 5,518 1,717 34,768
Little Worse 374 685 8,634 3,628 1,012 14,333
Much Worse 85 142 1,552 1,232 807 3,818









Table 1 presents the relationship between the computed health changes and the direct reports
on health changes. Individuals in the diagonal (in the oblique ellipse) are respondents with consis-
tent reports, since their computed health changes are in line with their self-reported health changes.
Given that both measures of health changes are categorical, in order to assess their level of corre-
lation we use the suggestions in Cohen (1960) and Fleiss (1981), and estimate the kappa-statistic,
which accounts for the fact that when comparing categorical variables a sizable proportion of the
agreement can be observed just by chance. Our estimate of kappa is very low, around 0.08, sug-
gesting only a slight agreement between the measures beyond what could be expected by chance.
This clearly provides another motivation for the further analysis of these measures.
16Those individuals whose computed health changes are zeros (in the horizontal ellipse), that is,
their self-rated health status falls into the same category as in the previous period, but are off the
diagonal, represent cases where the computed health changes could lead to a loss of information,
due to the fact that the health change might not be large enough to warrant a category jump. Notice
that these observations comprise a bit more than 15% of our sample, which should raise a ag of
caution for researchers who rely solely on self-reported health status and its lags without exploiting
the self-reported changes.
Those with inconsistent reports, but not due to loss of information, are the individuals in the
left bottom cells and right top cells, who are not in the two ellipses. These respondents account for
38.63% of the sample. As discussed in the last section, possible explanations of these inconsisten-
cies include the presence of gray areas, cut-point shifts, and also the peer effects. However, it is not
possible for us to assess the relative weight of these mechanisms in explaining the inconsistencies.
But notice, that in line with Eriksson et al. (2001), the group reporting to be in better health is
considerably larger if we use the computed health changes than if we use the self-reported health
changes. This suggests the possible overestimation of health changes when using a measure more
open to inter-personal comparisons. In any case, given that it is debatable which measure is bet-
ter without controlling for additional characteristics, we should be very careful in interpreting the
effects of computed health changes in any empirical model that tries to properly control for health
status and health dynamics, in the presence of these inconsistencies.
Table 2, using our full sample from all six waves of the data, shows that self-reported health
changes seem to have more information than the computed changes, since the average values of
a longevity expectations, and a variety of subjective and objective measures of health status vary
considerably more when the self-reported measure changes. Notice that for all the measures, the
difference between reporting better (or much better) and worse (or much worse) health is much
larger for the self-reported measure, meaning that the effect a particular health trajectory is more
explicit for this measure than for the computed measure. These tabulations give us some initial
evidence on the likely effects of these two variables in the conditional moments estimations we
present in Section 5.
17Table 2: Informational Content of Computed and Self-Reported Health Changes
Pliv75 Pliv85 ADL ADL Doctor
Mobility Muscles Visits
Health Changes Mean Sd. Mean Sd. Mean Sd. Mean Sd. Mean Sd.
MB Comp. Health 0.666 0.296 0.484 0.340 0.221 0.283 0.060 0.184 9.07 28.26
LB Comp. Health 0.659 0.285 0.478 0.319 0.210 0.266 0.044 0.149 8.29 13.65
LW Comp. Health 0.644 0.289 0.451 0.318 0.240 0.286 0.058 0.174 9.48 15.85
MW Comp. Health 0.616 0.315 0.429 0.335 0.303 0.321 0.097 0.235 13.19 26.42
MB Rept. Health 0.720 0.270 0.560 0.318 0.155 0.224 0.028 0.117 9.58 14.67
LB Rept. Health 0.676 0.277 0.487 0.313 0.203 0.256 0.042 0.146 10.31 21.79
LW Rept. Health 0.557 0.317 0.375 0.318 0.383 0.317 0.108 0.227 13.76 19.06
MW Rept. Health 0.408 0.352 0.270 0.321 0.621 0.327 0.306 0.354 24.04 37.47
For the sake of brevity in the main text of the paper, we discuss in Appendix B the empirical
evidence regarding the inconsistencies between our two main measures of health dynamics, as well
as empirical evidence of the phenomenon of information loss in using computed measures of health
changes. We also provide evidence of the longitudinal criterion validity of our measures of health
dynamics, in the sense of analyzing whether they capture health changes as measured by other
relevant variables of interest.
3.3 Sample and sample restrictions
Given the skip pattern of the longevity expectations variables we only include in our sample age
eligible respondents who were asked the questions about their survival probabilities, and were 65
years old or younger in order to have a consistent set of responses to the longevity expectations
questions. Furthermore, those with missing information on their parents' mortality have been ex-
cluded from our sample, since these variables play an important role in our empirical analysis. We
believe it is important to account for these genetically related health measures in our empirical
work. Additionally, individuals who died between our sample period (from 1992 to 2003) have
automatically dropped from our sample after they died.
18As a result, the sample used in the estimations includes more than 24,000 observations from
more than 9,000 individuals. Summary statistics for the full sample are presented in Table 3. 37%
of the sample are male, and 86% are whites. The sample is 58 years old on average, with 12.75
years of education. 82% are married.
There are reasons to suspect that sample selectivitymight be an issue in this study, given that we
are only able to observe individuals' subjective survival probabilities for those who answered the
questions. In the sample, we do observe people who are age eligible to answer these two probability
questions did not give any answer. More than 90% reported these two subjective survival probabil-
ities as of the rst wave of interviews, but depending on the wave the reporting rate has gone down
between 5 and 8 percentages points since then, although is less of an issue in our sub-sample of in-
dividuals 65 or younger. Table 3 also presents summary statistics after dividing the sample between
individuals who reported expected longevity and those who did not, for comparison. We observe
that respondents with better health status (both better self-rated health, and less chronic diseases,
or less functional limitations), with more education, and those who are white, are more likely to
report. Also parents' education have a positive correlation with the likelihood of reporting. Males
and those with health insurance coverage are more likely to report too; Finally, richer respondents
are less likely to report their expected longevities.
4 Econometric Specications
Our objective is to obtain consistent estimates of the effects of a variety of regressors on individual
longevity expectations that are measured by the self-reported probabilities of living to age 75. As
discussed in the introduction, our empirical model can be understood as estimating a production
function of longevity, since it is better characterized as a reduced form (in the sense, for example, of
Malinvaud (1966)) of the survival probabilities of a model of health investments under uncertainty
withendogenouslongevity,followingtheformulationinEhrlich(2000)and EhrlichandYin(2005).
Those authors provide us with the economic justication for the host of variables we include in our
econometric specications, where all of them should be understood as belonging to one of the
following three groups: variables proxying for natural and biological initial conditions; variables
19linked to the decisions made up to the period in which the longevity expectation is observed or the
depreciation of health over time, that modify the original initial conditions; and variables related to
the self-protection activities expected to have an effect on future longevity.
To reach this goal, a couple of econometric issues need to be tackled. First, we want to take into
account the unobserved heterogeneity potentially present in our characterization of the econometric
model, whichwesuspectmighthave a lottodo withthe wayindividualsreport theirhealth. Without
controlling for the unobserved components, we will be confounding partial and total effects of our
variables of interest. The panel data set we use allows us to model explicitly how those unobserved
components enter the econometric specication. Second, we need to consider the possible presence
of sample selection biases, since a non-trivial proportion of eligible individuals did not answer
the longevity questions. It is reasonable to believe that respondents who answered the questions
might not be a random sample from the population of interest, since those who are more likely to
expect to live longer would also be more likely to respond. We can perform this correction with the
techniques suggested by Heckman (1979) and Hsiao (1986). As we discuss in the next section, we
nd no evidence of selection bias in the models we estimate in this paper.
The HRS provides us with repeated observations of the same individuals, and this allows us to
control for potential unobserved components that could enter our econometric model. Our main








































































represents the measure of expected longevity reported by individuals in the sam-




of various socio-demographic, and family related variables which could be linked with the initial




capture the effects of the previous decisions and stochastic events occurred
up to the time of the report of the longevity probability (including depreciation of health) that mod-
ify the original initial conditions. These include the chronic conditions indicators, the indexes of
ADLs, the health limitation indicator, the insurance indicators, net wealth, income, and education,
20as well as the current health status. Third,
￿
:
is a vector of variables linked to the self-protection
activities that modify the natural factors, and the effects of the previous decisions on longevity.
These include measures of health changes, health care utilization, and health habits. Notice that
N
:
represents the unobserved heterogeneity component, and the
O
:
￿ are the idiosyncratic disturbances.
In this longevity estimation the econometrician cannot observe either the idiosyncratic component
or the individual component, while the individual does know his individual specic term. In the
results we also present OLS estimates with the pooled sample of observations controlling for clus-
tering (see Deaton (1997)), assuming there is no individual component.
The panel data model can be estimated either assuming no correlation between observed ex-
planatory variables and the unobserved individual effect (random effects), or allowing for arbitrary
correlation between the unobserved individual effect and the observed explanatory variables (xed
effects). We can then test whether the random effects specication or the xed effect specication is
more appropriate, and whether the former is more appropriate than the pooled OLS regression.18 In
our case, even though we are also interested in estimating the effects of a number of time invariant
regressors, the possibility of allowing for correlation between the unobserved component and the
regressors makes the xed effect the most appropriate estimator. This decision will be supported
by the specication tests.19
The econometric specications we have described so far only exploit the fact that individuals
responded repeatedly to the same longevity expectations questions, but have not directly focused on
why these reports might change from period to period. We further perform an additional economet-
ric analysis to directly explain how these reports have changed over time. Given the interpretation
of the previous model as an estimation of survival probabilities within a model of health invest-
18SeeWooldridge (2002) and Baltagi (2005) for up to date presentations of these issues.
19It has shown that, under some fairly realistic assumptions, the xed effect model can exacerbate a possible mea-
surement error problem. This means that a possible attenuation bias of the OLS or RE estimator (if measurement error
was a problem to start with) might grow even larger under the xed effect formulation. The common way to solve the
problem is to construct some type of Instrumental Variable estimator. We have performed extensive sensitivity anal-
ysis of our model using Panel Data instrumental variables techniques and found no evidence of these problems with
our FE specication. For example, a model that compares our preferred FE specication with the same specication
but instrumenting self-reported health with its lagged, rejected the panel IV specication in favor of the traditional
FE specication. Also, we have experimented with the Hausman and Taylor (1981) estimator which circumvents the
possible worsening of the measurement error problem by using a variation of the techniques utilized in the estimation
of instrumental variable models for panel data, and the results do not change in any signicant way.
21ment under uncertainty, the underlying hypothesis is that the relationship should be fairly stable
and therefore the observed changes should not be easily explained by variables which could be
predicted with some accuracy by individuals. We then estimate a model of changes in longevity
expectations as a function of changes in a variety of exogenous regressors, including changes in the
health variables of interest. We can think of this alternative model as trying to capture the source
of the innovations to the self-reported longevity expectations. We follow Ben´ tez-Silva and Dwyer
(2005) to set up the appropriate econometric model in order to capture the role of new information.
One conclusion from that work is that individuals integrate new and old information with weights
attached to each of these sources when updating their expectations.
Assuming the linearity of the function that individuals use to process information regarding
the variables of interest, and further assuming that the elements of the information set (
T ) used to









































































be represented in our empirical estimation by the changes in the exogenous characteristics) and
the expectation of this information individuals had in the previous period. If we had all these
elements, it would be possible to estimate (2) by a conditional moments estimator like OLS, and
would expect a coefcient of one in front of the longevity expectations as of time t under the
rational expectations hypothesis. The coefcients in
H (which we will assume are time invariant)
could be interpreted as the effect of the unanticipated components of new information on changes
in expectations. However, we do not observe the second element in the brackets. Although it
could be estimated by making further assumptions about the relationship between new and current




























































where there is no reason to believe that
C should be equal to 1: since the unobserved expectation
22term from (2) would enter into the error term, leading to possible biases in the coefcients of
interest. We will treat these possible biases as a problem of measurement error, which can be
ameliorated by using IV techniques. The estimates of the vector
H , are interpreted as the effects
of changes in specic factors of
T on longevity expectations formation. A nonzero coefcient of
a given change in a member of the information set can be interpreted as information not perfectly
anticipated, and therefore not embedded in the individuals' longevity expectations as of period the
previous period.
It is also very common in a variety of literatures to use a formulation that implicitly assumes
rational expectations, and proceeds by subtracting the self-reports of a given year from the self-
reports of the following year. We will see that our own results from estimating (3) cannot reject the
utilization of the specication shown below, at least on statistical grounds. The changes in expected






















































trols for time varying individual characteristics.
5 Empirical Results
5.1 Estimations of Expected Longevity
In Table 4 and Table 5 we provide the results of estimating expected longevity probability models,
using both cross-sectional and panel data. In all cases all the key health status and health changes
variables, and most of the other regressors in the estimation are signicant and have the intuitive
signs. The resultsacross specicationsvaryquantitatively,but theyall tellessentiallythesame story
in qualitative terms.20 Our main result is that both health status and health changes signicantly
20Some of the variables included in the estimation can be considered either measures of health care utilization (like
the number of doctor visits and hospitalizations, and even the indicators of chronic diseases) and therefore potentially
collinear with contemporaneoushealth indicators, or likely to be endogenous like an indicator for whether respondents
have children living within 10 miles. This is true in the structural model of health investments under uncertainty,
23affect self-reported expected longevity, and most strikingly, which measure of health changes is
used matters a great deal.
Table 4 presents the results of three different econometric specications of the longevity ex-
pectation in equation (1). The preferred econometric model is the Fixed Effect specication.21 The
presence of an individualspecic unobservedheterogeneitycomponentissupportedbythestandard
econometric tests, and further tests show that it is not appropriate to assume that this unobserved
heterogeneity is uncorrelated with the variables of interest.22
The Fixed Effect estimator captures the type of heterogeneity we have been describing in re-
lation to reporting. Fixed Effect estimates are unbiased under the assumption that each individual
has a particular pattern regarding the areas in which they distinguish the health categories, even if
the reporting of health might be varying over time due to the gray areas problem, The Fixed Effect
estimator is able to account for time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity, but it cannot remove any
remaining time-variant biases created by omitted variables.
From Table 4, it is clear that self-reported health changes are cleaner measures of health dynam-
so our effort should be understood as estimating a production function of longevity. The strategy of including in
the estimation a large number of health measures is validated by the ndings in Blau and Gilleskie (2001) that all
these measures contain related but complementary information to predict behavior or expectations. Those authors
model the endogeneity of both health and economic variables within a semiparametric random effects framework, and
acknowledge the importance of accounting for unobservedheterogeneity,which in our case we tackle (in our preferred
specications) with a xed effects estimator. As a sensitivity analysis, available from the authors upon request, we have
estimated all the specications we report here dropping these variables from the model, and our main results do not
change in any signicant way.
21One disadvantage of using the Fixed Effect estimator is that the effects of interesting variables like gender, race,
and education cannot be estimated. For this we can analyze the results of the Random Effects estimator, or perform
some sensitivity analysis with slightly different types of panel data models like those suggested in Hausman and Taylor
(1981). Due to space limitations, Table 4 does not report all coefcients. But as could be expected being a male is
correlated with signicantly lower probabilities of living to 75, other things equal (also if we perform an unconditional
test, females report a signicantly higher probability of living to 75). Rather unexpectedly but consistent with Hurd
and McGarry (1995), being white reduces the self-reported probability of living to age 75 (in an unconditional test,
whites do not report signicantly different longevity expectations), which might indicate that members of other races
are relatively more optimistic in their reports, other things equal. Moreover, higher levels of education are correlated
with higherexpectedlongevity. We havealso performedsomesensitivity analysis bydividingthe sampleby genderand
re-estimating our preferred specication. The results do not change qualitatively, but the quantitative effects of most
health variables (both subjective and objective measures) are larger for males. Some other variables, like the cognition
indicator (better cognition is predicted to increase expected longevity for females) or the net wealth measure (wealthier
females report, other things equal, lower expected longevity) are only signicant for females.
22Given the over sampling in the HRS of individuals with certain characteristics or living in Florida, we have used
the available sample weights to estimate both a pooled-OLS specication and also a selection corrected one. Those
results do not differ signicantly from the ones we present here. It is worth mentioning that the use of the weights lead
to the loss of a considerable number of observations given the cross-sectional nature of these weights, and made very
problematic any attempt to incorporate them in our panel data specications. We have experimented with the different
weights provided in the HRS and in all cases we have obtained similar results.
24ics, compared with the computed health change which uses the differences in self-reported health
status. Self-reported health change indicators for being in little worse or much worse health than
in the previous period have a negative sign in the estimations, indicating their intuitive correlation
with a decrease in the probabilities of living to age 75. This is true even after controlling for indi-
cators of excellent, very good, and good self-reported health status. Where the latter are positively
correlated with the probabilities of living to those ages. Interestingly, the magnitude, in absolute
value, of the effects of the self-reported health change indicators is very similar to that of the effects
of the self-reported health level indicators, while that of the effects of the computed health change
indicators on the probability of living to age 75 is much smaller.
Rather surprisinglyfor us at rst, the computed health change indicator for being in much worse
health has a very small positive (and in our preferred specication, insignicant) effect on the self-
reported longevity measures. There could be a number of possible interpretations for this result.
But all of them suggest caution to researchers in the use of self-reported health measures in longitu-
dinal studies, and especially the use of computed self-reported health changes as proxies for health
changes. In line with our discussion in section 2, we believe that the computed health changes are
very likely to be exposed to considerably more problems of unobserved heterogeneity in reporting.
This is because of the fact that many individuals might have a difcult time in distinguishing be-
tween the imposed cut-points for the health levels in a consistent way over the period of analysis,
leading to wide gray areas (in the terminology we have introduced). This version of the cut-point
shifts problem that is described in some detail in the literature on cross-country comparisons of
health, comes from the fact that there is nothing in the questionnaire suggesting to individuals that
they should use the same assessment as they did in the previous interviews, or even use the same
cut-points between health levels. The more pervasive this problem is, the more likely that computed
health changes could capture the importance of the gray-areas problem (or the problem of shifting
cut-points) that we presented in Figure 1. If that is the case, once we control for health levels,
computed changes in health are more likely to be an expression of the difculty to pinpoint their
own health level. This is true even after controlling for education and other socio-demographic
measures. In most cases its effects disappear once we account for unobserved heterogeneity that
25allows for correlation between the individual effect and the regressors of interest. These cut-points
shifts or movements of the gray areas seem to be correlated with events we are not quite able to
control for, and therefore could proxy for unobserved factors correlated with higher life expectancy.
A companion interpretation (and a fairly plausible one) is linked to the peer effects discussed
in section 2. If many individuals report their health using a reference group as a comparison basis,
then changes in health status might be more of an expression of the evolution of health compared
with that reference group and less of an expression of their own health. And the latter is the one
that we believe is more likely to be correlated with expected longevity. If computed deterioration in
self-reported health is more likely to capture a worse than your peers measure of health, there is no
reason to expect them to have a signicant negative correlation with expected longevity, which is
more likely to be mainly driven by actual health, regardless of interpersonal comparisons. In fact,
it is easy to believe that in general, the information ow from your peers, among people this age, is
more likely to be related to bad news about health events of people you know or your peers know.
If individuals mostly receive bad news about other people's health, and still think they are doing
worse on a health measure open to interpersonal comparisons, it might be they are overestimating
their health problems.
The insignicantand sometimespositiveeffects of the computedhealth deteriorationindicators,
contrast with the more intuitive, negative and signicant effect of the self-reported health deteriora-
tion variables. Remember that the latter is the result of a question that gives individuals a reference
point by asking them to compare their current health to their own health two years prior. Even
though we might expect recall errors on these responses, the formulation of the question is likely to
result in individuals performing an intra-personal comparison when reporting their health change.
Whether they take the exact health level two years ago (a level not given to them by the interviewer)
as a reference point, or if they respond with respect to some other point in a more recent past, is
not essential to our arguments. The fact is that this report is consistent with their answers regarding
expected longevity in a completely different section of the survey.
Overall, the results do indicate that self-reported health levels have the intuitive positive corre-
lation with the self-reported expected longevity in a cross-sectional sense. However, the problems
26arise when using differences in health status over time as measures of health changes. Although we
believe the differences in health reports over time do provide some information to researchers, they
are more likely a proxy for unobserved heterogeneity in reporting than in assessments of health
changes. Therefore, it is less problematic to use the self-reported health changes as measures of
health dynamics to avoid the problems with the computed measure.
Notice that the use of the Fixed Effect estimator in Table 4, and also Table 5, has two main
effects on our results. First, it decreases considerably the effect of self-reported health status indi-
cators. For example in Table 4, the magnitude of the coefcients indicating excellent, very good,
and good health, is reduced to about a third in the xed effect specication compared with the ran-
dom effects model. Namely, being in excellent health instead of increasing the average expected
probability by about 30%, as estimated in the OLS specication, or almost 23% as in the Random
Effect specication, it increases the longevity probability by only 6.6% in the Fixed Effect model.
This means that not accounting for unobserved heterogeneity, which correlates with the exogenous
variablesof interest, can lead toseriousbiases and misleadinginference. Second, the coefcientson
the computed health change indicators are sharply reduced as we move from the OLS specication
to the Fixed Effect estimator. Even if the coefcients are not very precisely estimated, they are very
close to zero, and become almost the smallest coefcients in the table. In contrast, the Fixed Effect
estimator does not affect as much the coefcients of the self-reported health change indicators. The
latter coefcients are slightly reduced, in absolute value, and very precisely estimated. The results
predict that the much worse self-reported health change indicator decreases the average expected
probability of living to age 75 by almost 10%, while reporting being in little worse health than in
the previous wave decreases the average expected probability of living to age 75 by around 4%.
Notice that the estimates of the other variables have the expected signs, and are in line with
the previous literature estimating both expected and actual longevity. For example, having most
chronic diseases or higher index of ADLs decreases the expected longevity probabilities, and the
same is true for those who were hospitalized more often. Furthermore, those in better cognitive
health (measured here by memory ability) expect to live longer, and the same is true for those with
kids living close to them, or those with more grandkids.
27We have also estimated all these specications accounting for possible sample selection biases,
due to lack of response to the longevity questions. The presence of sample selection bias is not
supported, and none of the coefcients vary in any signicant way. Therefore we have chosen to
omit those results here but they are available from the authors upon request.23
Table 5 provides some sensitivityanalysis of different specications, using subsets of the health
indicators.24 We only provide the results of our preferred Fixed Effect specication. We can see
that the effects of self-reported health status indicators are very stable, and signicantly increase
the average expected probability of living to age 75 more or less by the same magnitude as reported
in Table 4. The effects of the self-reported health changes are also stable and of similar magnitude.
The last two columns are especially interesting since they estimate a model with lagged health
status, which follows a fairly standard literature that uses this kind of specication to account for
the dynamics of health. Notice that especially when we include the little worse or much worse
self-reported health change indicators, the lagged health indicator of being in excellent health is
estimated to have a signicant but very small effect on expected longevity. The effects are about
23In the selection equations we used an indicator of self-reported retirement status as exclusion restriction, on the
grounds that retired individuals are more likely to have considered their longevity than workers, while not necessarily
expected to live longer or shorter lives. An additional source of selection into the sample used for estimation is sur-
vivorship bias. Given that our dependent variables are measures of longevity, it is natural to expect that those dying
between the waves would be the ones reporting lower probabilities of surviving to certain ages, leaving our sample
of survivors as a selected group of respondents that expect to live longer. In fact, we have used the exit interview
information from the HRS to compare the expected survival probabilities of those we know survived to the next wave,
with the expected probabilities of those we know die between waves (about 7% of the original wave 1 sample had died
by wave 6). Our ndings indicate that eventual survivors reported signicantly higher probabilities of living to age 75
and 85, suggesting that survivorship bias could be an issue in our data. In order to assess the effects of this source of
selection in our sample we have followed the recommendationsin Portrait et al. (2004)to construct additional selection
correction terms, and have included them in our preferred specications. Even though in most cases these selection
terms were marginally signicant, the effects on the results we report in this section were negligible. These results
are available from the authors upon request. One possible problem of actually controlling for this additional selection
concernis that the correctionterms we have constructed to account for this possible bias are likely to be correlatedwith
the selection term regarding responses to the longevity questions. The reason for this concern is that those that ended
up dying between waves were considerably less likely to report expected longevity probabilities. In fact, the difference
in response rates is around 14 percentage points, and it is highly signicant. If the probability to respond is serially
correlated,it is likelythat the unobservedcomponentsthat makesomeonemorelikely to respondarecorrelatedwith the
unobserved components that make that same individual more likely to survive. This would mean that the introduction
of the additional correction terms would result in collinearity problems and additional biases of its own.
24We have estimated these specications allowing for serial correlation in the idiosyncratic component in the xed
effect model, and have experimented with the Hausman and Taylor (1981) estimator which allows only a subset of the
regressorsin the xed effectestimation to be correlatedwith the unobservedindividualcomponent(in ourcase we have
assumed the correlation was with the health reporting variables, and also with education). Both types of specications
provide essentially identical results to the ones presented in our preferred specications. These results are available
from the authors upon request.
28three times smaller than the effects of the current health status indicators. More importantly, they
are much smaller in absolute value than the effects of the self-reported health change indicators.
The conclusion from this is twofold. Although lagged health indicators can have a signicant but
small effect on expected longevity, they fail to capture the dynamic effect of health picked up by
the self-reported health change indicators. The coefcients on the latter indicators are basically
unaffected by the inclusion of the lagged health indicators.25
5.2 Changes in Expected Longevity
Table 6 presents the estimates of the model from equation (3) trying to capture the effect of new
information on the changes in expected longevities. Following some of the recommendations of
Ben´ tez-Silva and Dwyer (2005) we use an Instrumental Variables procedure, without assuming
rational expectations, in which variables with a signicant effect would capture what has not been
anticipated by individuals.26 Therefore, it is not surprising to see in the table that some of the
computed health change indicators are signicant in this context, since they can capture innova-
tions either regarding the comparisons between the evolution of the person's health with that of
their peers, or regarding cut-point shifts, which are more likely to come as a surprise than the
information on their own health. The computed health changes do play a signicant role in this
specication, which conrms the argument that although it is clearly a problematic measure to use
to proxy for health dynamics, it indicates that the self-reported health status is longitudinally valid,
since it captures unanticipated changes, even in a conditional moments estimation.
Notice that not too many variables are signicant in this specication, in fact in the preferred
25We have estimated these preferred specications using the expected probability of living to age 85 as dependent
variable. The results are qualitatively identical to the ones just presented for the Pliv75 variable, and are available upon
request. The only differences are that now selection does matter, and the effects of the lagged self-reported health
indicators are estimated to be smaller and in most cases insignicant. As discussed in Hurd and McGarry (2002) and
Hamermesh (1985), the Pliv85 seems to be less in line with the life tables than Pliv75, with explanations linked to
possible lack of adjustments by sex when forming longer term expectations, or the possibility of individuals assuming
past improvementsin life expectancywill continueand affect them favorably. We believethat an additionalexplanation
is linked to the argument about the possibility of the responses to the Pliv85 questions being taken by some individuals
to mean that Pliv85 are conditional on Pliv75, which would cause an upward bias for those respondents, as found by
previous researchers. Given this evidence, we have chosen to use the estimation of the Pliv75 model as our benchmark.
26The exclusion restrictions we have used to identify the IV procedure include the years of education of the respon-
dent's parents. These exclusion restrictions pass the over-identication tests and the weak instruments tests, indicating
their appropriateness in the estimation procedure.
29specications in columns 3 and 4, the only consistently signicant variables are the self-reported
healthchange indicators, thechange in theindexof ADL-Mobility,thenew diagnosedof highblood
pressure and diabetes (which actually have a positive effect on the changes of Pliv75, probably
indicating illnesses nally being treated and therefore more likely under control than before), and
the change in the number of grandchildren. In line with the ndings by Ben´ tez-Silva and Dwyer
(2005) on a very different context, the results seem to be consistent with the Rational Expectations
Hypothesis.27
However, as those authors emphasize, this specication is not strictly speaking a rational expec-
tations test, due to the informational requirements it imposes, assumingthat individualsare forming
expectations over the changes in the variables affecting the dependent variable. Column four actu-
ally uses the fact that the coefcient on the lagged expected longevity is not signicantly different
from 1, to estimate the more common specication that has the difference in expected longevity
probabilities as dependent variable, as presented in equation (4). The results are very similar. The
main difference is that the effects of the self-reported and computed health change to much worse
are now considerably larger, which we interpret as indicating that although not statistically incor-
rect, assuming that the coefcient on lagged Pliv75 is 1 can create some biases in the coefcients
of variables that are correlated with the lagged expectation.28
6 Conclusions
This is one of the rst papers to directly study the use of subjective measures of health changes in
order to capture the dynamic effect of health on both individuals' expected survival probabilities
and how they evolve over time. The former empirical model should be understood as an object
akin to a production function of longevity within a model of health investments under uncertainty
 a la Grossman (1972), following the formulation in Ehrlich (2000). Our ndings are important
for a wide range of behavioral or empirical studies in which health dynamics are likely to play an
27See also Ben´ tez-Silva and Dwyer (2006), and Ben´ tez-Silva et al. (2006) for a discussion of rational expectations
tests using the Health and Retirement Study.
28We have also estimated these specications using the expected probability of living to age 85. The results do not
change in any signicant way, except for the fact that some additional variables become signicant. For example, the
recent death of the mother has a negative effect on expected longevity. These results are available upon request.
30important role along with the standard health status measures.
In our sample, we observe that for a large proportion of the individuals, the difference between
the self-reported health in two consecutive waves is not consistent with the self-reported health
changes between the same two waves. This fosters our discussion that allows us to provide possi-
ble explanations for these differences, and at the same time illuminates the estimation results that
suggest caution to researchers using self-reported health status and computed self-reported health
changes in many empirical applications. Our ndings provide support for the use of self-reported
health changes, whenever possible, to capture the dynamic component of health, as a key com-
plement to self-reported health status. We nd that the effect of our preferred measure of health
changesonlongevityexpectationsisofthesameorder ofmagnitudeas theeffectoftheself-reported
health level, while using computed measures of health changes would lead to a downward bias of
the effects of health changes on longevity expectations.
Moreover, we compare the effect of the two measures of health changes on the changes in
the expected survival probabilities. Our results show that after controlling for the change of self-
reported health and the change of other objective health measures, there is evidence that computed
health changes are not perfectly anticipated and therefore have some explanatory power in this kind
of econometric specication. This suggests that self-reported health measures are longitudinally
valid. However, the explanation for the reason behind their signicance in these types of econo-
metric models could also be linked with possible time-variant unobserved heterogeneity regarding
reporting behavior of health status.
Most of the efforts in the profession have been concentrated in the cross-sectional properties of
health indicators. However, with the growing number of panel data sets that provide self-reported
measures of a variety of variables, there is a growing need to understand the pros and cons of using
these measures in longitudinal econometric models. We believe our ndings will foster further re-
search on the longitudinal properties of self-reported measures in household surveys, the dynamics
of health, and the measures of health changes in general. Althoughwe have paid particular attention
to self-reported health given the wide use of these measures in just about any empirical application
using household level data, our ndings could be of use in many other contexts where self-reports
31are used, and the dynamics of self-reported measures are considered to be important.
32Table 3: Summary Statistics
Variable Full Sample Reported Pliv Did not report Pliv
Mean (Sd.) Mean (Sd.) Mean (Sd.)
Observations 24,555 23,717 842
Probability of Living to 75 0.663 (0.279) 0.663 (0.279) 
Probability of Living to 85 0.464 (0.310) 0.464 (0.310) 
Excellent Health 0.186 (0.389) 0.189 (0.392) 0.099 (0.298)
Very good Health 0.339 (0.473) 0.343 (0.475) 0.207 (0.405)
Fair Health 0.135 (0.341) 0.131 (0.337) 0.238 (0.426)
Poor Health 0.054 (0.225) 0.051 (0.219) 0.137 (0.344)
SR. Health Much Better 0.046 (0.210) 0.046 (0.211) 0.046 (0.210)
SR. Health Little Better 0.071 (0.258) 0.072 (0.258) 0.059 (0.236)
SR. Health Little Worse 0.144 (0.351) 0.142 (0.349) 0.181 (0.385)
SR. Health Much Worse 0.031 (0.174) 0.030 (0.171) 0.068 (0.251)
Comp. Health Much Better 0.030 (0.171) 0.030 (0.170) 0.034 (0.182)
Comp. Health Little Better 0.174 (0.379) 0.174 (0.379) 0.163 (0.369)
Comp. Health Little Worse 0.208 (0.406) 0.209 (0.407) 0.182 (0.386)
Comp. Health Much Worse 0.047 (0.212) 0.046 (0.209) 0.087 (0.282)
High Blood Pressure 0.413 (0.492) 0.410 (0.492) 0.494 (0.500)
Diabetes 0.121 (0.327) 0.119 (0.324) 0.195 (0.396)
Cancer 0.076 (0.265) 0.076 (0.265) 0.082 (0.274)
Lung Disease 0.081 (0.273) 0.081 (0.272) 0.089 (0.285)
Heart Disease 0.139 (0.346) 0.138 (0.345) 0.157 (0.364)
Stroke 0.033 (0.179) 0.032 (0.177) 0.052 (0.223)
Arthritis 0.485 (0.500) 0.483 (0.500) 0.561 (0.497)
ADL-Mobility 0.172 (0.233) 0.170 (0.231) 0.216 (0.275)
ADL-Muscles 0.176 (0.265) 0.173 (0.263) 0.256 (0.313)
ADL-Other 0.022 (0.101) 0.021 (0.099) 0.049 (0.146)
IADL 0.031 (0.089) 0.030 (0.087) 0.066 (0.136)
Smoking 0.200 (0.400) 0.201 (0.401) 0.181 (0.385)
Drinking 0.546 (0.498) 0.554 (0.497) 0.335 (0.472)
No Health Insurance 0.181 (0.385) 0.179 (0.383) 0.233 (0.423)
Health Limitation 0.223 (0.416) 0.220 (0.414) 0.298 (0.458)
Doctor Visits 8.025 (14.357) 7.981 (14.327 9.260 (15.132
Hospital Stays 0.405 (2.304) 0.397 (2.225) 0.624 (3.920)
SR. Memory Ability 3.221 (0.944) 3.234 (0.940) 2.863 (0.988)
Age 58.014 (5.020) 57.981 (5.035) 58.935 (4.478)
Male 0.365 (0.482) 0.367 (0.482) 0.306 (0.461)
White 0.860 (0.347) 0.867 (0.339) 0.654 (0.476)
Married 0.822 (0.383) 0.825 (0.380) 0.733 (0.443)
Years of Education 12.749 (2.833) 12.826 (2.760) 10.595 (3.842)
Net Wealth ($100,000) 3.500 (12.739) 3.454 (11.628) 4.797 (30.400)
Total Income ($10,000) 2.106 (2.804) 2.130 (2.784) 1.427 (3.235)
Indicator of Father Living to 75 0.456 (0.498) 0.455 (0.498) 0.482 (0.500)
Indicator of Mother Living to 75 0.599 (0.490) 0.601 (0.490) 0.565 (0.496)
Mother's years Education 9.761 (3.472) 9.837 (3.421) 7.620 (4.133)
Father's years Education 9.422 (3.826) 9.491 (3.790) 7.481 (4.297)
Indicator of Kids Living Close 0.522 (0.500) 0.521 (0.500) 0.545 (0.498)
Number of Grandkids 3.512 (4.493) 3.464 (4.437) 4.876 (5.698)
33Table 4: Estimation of Pliv7529
Variable30 Pooled OLS Random Eff. Fixed Eff.
Coef. (S.E.) Coef. (S.E.) Coef (S.E.)
Excellent Health 0.206 (0.008) 0.155 (0.008) 0.044 (0.012)
Very Good Health 0.145 (0.007) 0.110 (0.007) 0.036 (0.009)
Good Health 0.087 (0.006) 0.063 (0.006) 0.020 (0.007)
SR. Health Change-Same -0.029 (0.005) -0.021 (0.005) -0.016 (0.005)
SR. Health Change-Little Worse -0.046 (0.007) -0.034 (0.006) -0.025 (0.007)
SR. Health Change-Much Worse -0.104 (0.012) -0.084 (0.011) -0.063 (0.012)
Comp. Health Change-Same 0.023 (0.004) 0.017 (0.004) 0.0001 (0.005)
Comp. Health Change-Little Worse 0.054 (0.006) 0.037 (0.005) -0.002 (0.006)
Comp. Health Change-Much Worse 0.102 (0.009) 0.072 (0.008) 0.008 (0.010)
High Blood Pressure -0.002 (0.004) -0.004 (0.004) 0.004 (0.007)
Diabetes -0.029 (0.005) -0.026 (0.006) -0.008 (0.011)
Cancer -0.034 (0.006) -0.036 (0.007) -0.036 (0.012)
Lung Disease -0.033 (0.006) -0.034 (0.007) -0.012 (0.012)
Heart Disease -0.031 (0.005) -0.032 (0.006) -0.024 (0.009)
Stroke -0.016 (0.010) -0.026 (0.011) -0.040 (0.018)
Arthritis 0.009 (0.004) 0.003 (0.004) 0.001 (0.007)
ADL-Mobility -0.054 (0.010) -0.057 (0.010) -0.050 (0.012)
ADL-Muscles 0.012 (0.010) -0.006 (0.009) -0.010 (0.011)
ADL-Other -0.091 (0.020) -0.069 (0.018) -0.054 (0.022)
IADL -0.060 (0.021) -0.043 (0.020) 0.004 (0.024)
Smoking -0.039 (0.004) -0.033 (0.005) 0.001 (0.009)
Drinking 0.014 (0.003) 0.010 (0.004) 0.001 (0.006)
No Health Insurance -0.007 (0.004) -0.011 (0.004) -0.012 (0.005)
Health Limitation -0.003 (0.005) -0.010 (0.005) -0.010 (0.006)
Doctor Visits 0.0001 (0.0001) -0.0001 (0.0001) -0.0003 (0.0001)
Hospital Stays -0.002 (0.001) -0.002 (0.001) -0.002 (0.001)
SR. Memory Ability 0.022 ( 0.002 ) 0.014 (0.002) 0.004 (0.002)
Years of Education 0.003 (0.001) 0.005 (0.001) 
Net Wealth ($100,000) 0.0002 (0.0001) -0.0001 (0.0001) -0.0002 (0.0002)
Total Income ($10,000) -0.001 (0.001) -0.0004 (0.001) -0.0003 (0.001)
Indicator of Dad Living to 75 0.045 (0.003) 0.040 (0.004) -0.002 (0.019)
Indicator of Mom Living to 75 0.046 (0.003) 0.039 (0.005) 0.007 (0.013)
Years of Mother's Education 0.004 (0.001) 0.004 (0.001) 
Years of Father's Education 0.000 (0.001) 0.001 (0.001) 
Kids Living Close -0.010 (0.003) -0.003 (0.004) 0.007 (0.005)
Number of Grandkids 0.002 (0.000) 0.001 (0.000) 0.001 (0.001)





































w , p-value: 0.000.
30We also include a constant, age, age-squared, number of siblings, and indicators of gender, race, marital status,
psychological problems, and interview wave.
34Table 5: Sensitivity Analysis of Pliv75 estimation using Fixed-Effect Model
Variable31 Coef. (S.E.) Coef (S.E.) Coef (S.E.) Coef. (S.E.) Coef (S.E.)
Excellent Health 0.051 (0.009) 0.049 (0.012) 0.042 (0.009) 0.054 (0.009) 0.044 (0.009)
Very Good Health 0.042 (0.007) 0.041 (0.009) 0.034 (0.008) 0.044 (0.007) 0.035 (0.008)
Good Health 0.026 (0.006) 0.025 (0.007) 0.020 (0.007) 0.027 (0.007) 0.020 (0.007)
Excellent Lagged Health    0.014 (0.008) 0.017 (0.008)
Very Good Lagged Health    0.009 (0.007) 0.012 (0.007)
Good Lagged Health    0.007 (0.007) 0.009 (0.007)
Comp. Health Change-Same  -0.001 ( 0.005)   
Comp. Health Change-Little Worse  -0.004 (0.006)   
Comp. Health Change-Much Worse  0.002 ( 0.010)   
SR. Health Change-Same   -0.016 (0.005)  -0.017 (0.005)
SR. Health Change-Little Worse   -0.025 (0.007)  -0.026 (0.007)
SR. Health Change-Much Worse   -0.058 (0.012)  -0.063 (0.012)
Cancer -0.040 (0.012) -0.038 (0.012) -0.038 (0.012) -0.037 (0.012) -0.034 (0.012)
Heart Disease -0.024 (0.009) -0.023 (0.009) -0.024 (0.009) -0.022 (0.009) -0.023 (0.009)
Stroke -0.039 (0.018) -0.038 (0.018) -0.041 (0.018) -0.037 (0.018) -0.039 (0.018)
ADL-Mobility -0.052 (0.012) -0.055 (0.012) -0.048 (0.012) -0.054 (0.012) -0.049 (0.012)
ADL-Muscles -0.012 (0.011) -0.013 (0.011) -0.010 (0.011) -0.012 (0.011) -0.010 (0.011)
ADL-Other -0.062 (0.022) -0.063 (0.022) -0.054 (0.022) -0.063 (0.022) -0.054 (0.022)
No Health Insurance -0.012 (0.005) -0.012 (0.005) -0.012 (0.005) -0.012 (0.005) -0.012 (0.005)
Hospital Stays -0.002 (0.001) -0.002 (0.001) -0.002 (0.001) -0.002 (0.001) -0.002 (0.001)
SR. Memory Ability 0.005 (0.002) 0.005 (0.002) 0.005 (0.002) 0.004 (0.002) 0.004 (0.002)
Indicator of Dad Living to 75 0.000 (0.019) -0.001 (0.019) 0.000 (0.019) -0.001 (0.019) -0.001 (0.019)
Indicator of Mom Living to 75 0.007 (0.013) 0.007 (0.013) 0.007 (0.013) 0.007 (0.013) 0.007 (0.013)
Indicator of Kids Living Close 0.007 (0.005) 0.007 (0.005) 0.007 (0.005) 0.007 (0.005) 0.007 (0.005)
Number of Grandkids 0.001 (0.001) 0.001 (0.001) 0.001 (0.001) 0.001 (0.001) 0.001 (0.001)
Observations 24,169 24,059 24,156 24,059 24,052
x
y
0.050 0.052 0.049 0.063 0.064
Predicted Pliv75 0.662 0.662 0.662 0.662 0.662
31We also include a constant, age, age-squared, number of siblings, wealth, income, index of IADL, doctor visits, and indicators of marital status, psychological
problems, health limitation, smoking, drinking, high blood pressure, diabetes, arthritis, lung disease, and interview wave.
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5Table 6: Estimation of Changes in Pliv75
Variable32 IV IV IV RE
Coef. (S.E.) Coef. (S.E.) Coef. (S.E.) Coef. (S.E.)
Pliv75 in Previous Wave 0.972(0.093) 0.970(0.099) 0.964(0.097) 
Comp. Health-Same -0.021(0.006)  -0.007(0.007) -0.003(0.007)
Comp. Health-Little Worse -0.036(0.008)  -0.020(0.012) -0.014(0.009)
Comp. Health-Much Worse -0.055(0.016)  -0.055(0.025) -0.066(0.016)
SR. Health-Same  -0.009(0.007) -0.020(0.006) -0.018(0.006)
SR. Health-Little Worse  -0.027(0.012) -0.033(0.009) -0.033(0.007)
SR. Health-Much Worse  -0.063(0.025) -0.047(0.017) -0.056(0.012)
Newly Diagnosed High Blood Pressure 0.020(0.010) 0.019(0.011) 0.021(0.010) 0.017(0.011)
Newly Diagnosed Diabetes 0.020(0.020) 0.026(0.019) 0.025(0.019) 0.032(0.016)
Newly Diagnosed Cancer -0.024(0.021) -0.028(0.020) -0.024(0.020) -0.014(0.020)
Newly Diagnosed Lung Disease -0.008(0.024) -0.007(0.024) -0.004(0.024) -0.015(0.020)
Newly Diagnosed Heart Disease -0.018(0.017) -0.015(0.017) -0.015(0.017) 0.002(0.015)
Newly Diagnosed Stroke -0.062(0.040) -0.054(0.039) -0.054(0.039) -0.027(0.029)
Newly Diagnosed Arthritis -0.002(0.010) -0.002(0.010) -0.001(0.010) 0.003(0.009)
Change in ADL-Mobility -0.038(0.015) -0.038(0.016) -0.033(0.016) -0.022(0.013)
Change in ADL-Muscles -0.013(0.014) -0.015(0.014) -0.012(0.014) -0.006(0.012)
Change in ADL-Other -0.113(0.036) -0.111(0.037) -0.107(0.036) -0.071(0.025)
Started to Smoke 0.0001(0.021) -0.0001(0.021) 0.0004(0.021) 0.006(0.018)
Started to Drink 0.002(0.010) 0.002(0.011) 0.002(0.010) -0.0004(0.010)
Change in Doctor Visits -0.0003(0.0002) -0.0003(0.0002) -0.0003(0.0002) -0.0003(0.0002)
Change in Days Hospitalized -0.002(0.001) -0.002(0.001) -0.002(0.001) -0.001(0.001)
New Widowhood 0.020(0.021) 0.021(0.021) 0.019(0.021) 0.005(0.017)
Newly Father's Death 0.011(0.013) 0.010(0.013) 0.011(0.013) 0.007(0.014)
Newly Mother's Death 0.001(0.011) 0.001(0.011) 0.002(0.011) -0.003(0.011)
Changes in Num of Grandkids 0.002(0.001) 0.002(0.001) 0.002(0.001) 0.002(0.001)
Observations 12,245 12,242 12,232 13,822
Test of Weak Instruments Reject, p=0.000 Reject, p=0.000 Reject, p=0.000 
Test of Over-Id. Restrictions Cannot Rej. p=0.286 Cannot Rej. p=0.276 Cannot Rej. p=0.262 
32We also include a constant, years of education, changes in wealth, income, siblings alive, and memory ability, and indicators of race, gender, loss of health insurance,
kids moving close, onset of psychological problems, and onset of a health limitation.
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6Appendix A: Cross-Sectional Validity of Self-Reported Health Measures
The traditional literature on the (cross-sectional) validity of self-reported health measures stems
partly from the fact that there is an increasingly large number of surveys that ask many questions
about individuals' self-assessment of their health, or labor market opportunities. While in general
these questions are regarded as very useful, they still raise a host of potential problems. To date,
there seems to be little agreement as to the (cross-sectional) validity of such measures.
As shown in Table A.1. using the rst six waves of the Health and Retirement Survey, self-
reported health is valid in the sense of its correlation with a host of variables that measure health
status in both subjective and objectives ways. There is a strong monotonic relationship between the
categorical health indicator and the different measures we present, and the correlations are quite
high. People with better self-reported health status expect to live longer, have less difculties in
performing activities of daily living in terms of mobility (dened here as an index between 0 and
1, with increments of 1/6 for each of 6 indicators of mobility limitations), have less difculties
performing activities that require the use of large muscles (dened here as an index between 0 and
1, with increments of 1/6 for each of the indicators of use of large muscles) and visited the doctor
much less inthe year before the interview. However, some of the measures presented in the columns
can be problematic. First, all of them are self-reported. Second, doctor visits can be considered a
measure of health care utilization and therefore its correlation with any contemporaneous health
measure should not necessarily be interpreted as evidence of the validity of the health indicator.
Fortunately, even if the product of self-reports, the different ADLs-IADLs indexes are probably
the cleanest measures available, and the ones with the highest correlation with the self-assessed
health measure (correlation coefcients between a categorical variable and continuous ones should
be interpreted with caution). In any case, all the measures point in the same direction, leaving little
doubt about the information content of the self-reported health measure.
Table A.1.: Self-Reported Health Status and Related Measures
Pliv75 Pliv85 ADL ADL Doctor
Mobility Muscles Visits
Health Status Mean Sd. Mean Sd. Mean Sd. Mean Sd. Mean Sd.
Excellent Health 0.779 0.228 0.608 0.293 0.066 0.134 0.007 0.059 4.48 10.46
Very Good Health 0.713 0.242 0.523 0.295 0.119 0.182 0.012 0.075 6.17 8.25
Good Health 0.636 0.276 0.443 0.309 0.209 0.248 0.033 0.125 8.80 14.29
Fair Health 0.524 0.320 0.353 0.325 0.386 0.310 0.105 0.223 13.71 20.99
Poor Health 0.378 0.351 0.249 0.319 0.612 0.318 0.274 0.336 22.03 34.17
Correlation Coefcients with Self-Reported Health
0.3546 0.3047 -0.5231 -0.3158 -0.2863
However, the fact that self-reports seem to be meaningful does not imply we can blindly use
them in our estimations without considering whether these measures should pass further tests be-
fore including them with condence in our models. One important concern is about the potential
endogeneity of these measures relative to the issue under study. Many previous researchers have
suggested that self-assessed health measures might exaggerate individuals' actual health due to the
tendency of respondents to use health problems as a convenient rationalization for difculties in
the labor market, putting in doubt the validity of these measures.33 For example, in studies of the
33For extended discussions of this justication hypothesis and related possible problems with self-reported health
measures see Johnson (1977), Lambrinos (1981), Myers (1982), Parson (1982), Bazzoli (1985), Anderson and
Burkhauser (1985), Stern (1989), Bound (1991), Kerkhofs and Lindeboom (1995), Blau and Gilleskie (2001), Bound
37retirement decision, if the respondent's self-reported health status is merely a rationalization of the
labor force decision (e.g., reporting being in poor health if they withdrew from the labor force),
then unobserved factors affecting the labor supply decision will also affect self-reported health sta-
tus. This implies that self-reported health is endogenous, which is likely to bias the coefcients
of interest. Consequently, the large signicant estimates of the impact of self-reported health may
not indicate that this is a good measure of true health status, but merely a noisy measure of the
dependent variable.
Another concern about the reliability of self-reported health status might stem from measure-
ment error due to misreporting of respondents. However, the hypothesis that individuals system-
atically misreport their health and disability status in a survey that makes strong condentiality
assurances does not seem highly plausible to us. Specically, we found a high degree of internal
consistency in responses to questions across the various sections of the HRS survey.34 For this to be
a source of major problems, the respondents had to tightly coordinate their misreporting with other
more objective reports, such as beginning and ending dates of jobs, dates of application, receipt
of DI benets, etc. If we were to believe that respondentsare sophisticatedenough to systematically
misreport information in such a coordinated, internally consistent manner, we must question virtu-
ally all of their survey responses, including all objective health and functional status indicators.
However, the literature rarely questions the validity of the objective health status measures.35
For the purposes of our study, it is unlikely that health reports are used to rationalize expected
longevity reports. However, self-reported health could still be problematic for a number of reasons
explained in the text, which motivates our empirical strategy of comparing different measures of
health changes to better understand the consequences of using these indicators in a variety of em-
pirical models. Also, as argued in the introduction, our econometric model should be understood as
a reduced form characterization of the endogenous mortality probabilities resulting from a utility
maximizing framework of health investments under uncertainty, in which self-protection activities
reduce mortality probabilities.
Appendix B: Inconsistencies, Longitudinal Criterion Validity, and Informa-
tion Loss
In thisappendix we providesome empiricalevidence regardingthe inconsistenciesbetween our two
main measures of health dynamics, as well as empirical evidence of the phenomenonof information
loss in using computed measures of health changes. We also discuss the longitudinal criterion
validity of our measures of health dynamics. The latter concept borrows from the discussions
in McDowell and Newell (1987) and Streiner and Norman (1989) to analyze the correlation of
different measures of health changes in the absence of a natural gold standard.
Table B.1. explores the inconsistencies between self-reported health changes and computed
health changes. The table allows us to observe whether the changes in related health indicators
are in line with the changes in computed health changes or self-reported health changes, when
et al. (1998), Kreider (1999), Bound et al. (1999), Kerkhofs et al. (1999), O'Donnell (1998), Dwyer and Mitchell
(1999), McGarry (2004), and Au et al. (2005).
34See Ben´ tez-Silva et al. (2004) for a discussion, as well as a study of the bias in self-reported disability.
35Bound (1991) is an exception to this sweeping statement. He argues that part of the problem is that the objective
health variables measure health, rather than work capacity. Bound also notes that misreporting of variables tends to
have counteractingeffects. Baker et al. (2004)also question objectivemeasures using a dataset that matches (objective)
self-reports with medical records, they nd evidence of considerable response error that might lead to attenuation bias
in empirical work.
38they are inconsistent with each other. The table not only indicates that computed health changes
capture fairly well the changes in a number of objectiveand subjectiveindicators, but also show that
conditional on a given computed health change, the self-reported health change adds information.
Table B.1: Inconsistencies Between Computed and Self-Reported Health Changes36
Changes Changes Changes in Changes in Changes
in in ADL ADL in Doctor
Pliv75 Pliv85 Mobility Muscles Visits
Health Changes Mean Sd. Mean Sd. Mean Sd. Mean Sd. Mean Sd.
Comp-Better; SR-Better 0.032 0.27 0.053 0.31 -0.045 0.23 -0.010 0.14 -1.66 30.72
Comp-Better; SR-Same 0.021 0.28 0.037 0.31 -0.011 0.21 -0.003 0.12 -0.53 16.10
Comp-Better; SR-Worse 0.014 0.32 0.016 0.31 0.019 0.29 0.020 0.23 0.13 22.70
Comp-Worse; SR-Better -0.015 0.28 -0.017 0.30 0.017 0.20 0.010 0.12 1.94 15.45
Comp-Worse; SR-Same -0.016 0.27 -0.009 0.30 0.029 0.20 0.009 0.10 1.24 12.12
Comp-Worse; SR-Worse -0.054 0.31 -0.048 0.32 0.140 0.29 0.074 0.23 6.67 26.53
For example, conditional on being in better health by the computed health indicator, being
in worse health by the self-reported indicator is correlated with comparatively lower increases in
longevity expectations, and comparatively higher number of doctor visits. On the other hand, con-
ditional on being in worse health by the computed health measure, those in better self-reported
health have comparatively smaller decreases in expected life expectancy, and smaller increases in
the more objective measures of health problems like ADLs and doctor visits. This evidence sug-
gests that in the models that try to capture the effects of new information on changes in longevity
expectations we should incorporate both types of measures since they seem to be providing com-
plementary information. From the latter, we can also conclude that self-reported health status seem
to be longitudinally criterion valid since it captures change in a signicant way.
Table B.2 presents evidence of loss of information. In those cases where the computed health
measure indicates that there has been no health change, but we observe changes in the self-reported
health change indicators, we can see that the variables capturing changes in objectiveand subjective
measures of health status are more consistentwith the self-reported changes than with the computed
ones.
Table B.2: Loss of Information: How Changes in Longevity Expectations and Health Indicators
Respond to SR Health Changes when Health Status remains unchanged
Changes Changes Changes in Changes in Changes
in in ADL ADL in Doctor
Pliv75 Pliv85 Mobility Muscles Visits
Health Changes Mean Sd. Mean Sd. Mean Sd. Mean Sd. Mean Sd.
Comp-Same; SR-MB 0.010 0.27 0.023 0.30 -0.013 0.19 -0.008 0.09 0.584 13.56
Comp-Same; SR-LB 0.002 0.25 0.007 0.28 -0.009 0.20 -0.001 0.12 -0.331 17.41
Comp-Same; SR-LW -0.010 0.29 -0.005 0.30 0.061 0.26 0.021 0.20 2.723 22.19
Comp-Same; SR-MW -0.025 0.38 -0.020 0.32 0.084 0.32 0.096 0.31 5.131 37.75
36In this table we have combined the much better (worse) category with the little better (worse) category. Following
the suggestion of a referee we have also constructed the table conditioning on the self-reported measure, and we found
that the computed measure also adds information.
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